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Appeals.5 For example, in Moench v. Robertson, the Third Circuit explained that (1) ESOPs are
consistent with the formulation of a trust because they are formulated with the primary purpose
of investing in employer securities and (2) “[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with
respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to
prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.” (emphasis added).6
In Fifth Third, the Supreme Court changed this abuse of discretion standard to the
“stricter” “prudent person” standard applied to all ESOP fiduciaries under 29 U.S.C. § 1104.7
But while Fifth Third seemed to create a heavier burden for ESOP fiduciaries, the devil was in
the details.8 The Supreme Court also announced that, in the case of publicly traded stock, absent
“special circumstances,” the “prudent person” standard would not require an ESOP to recognize
from publicly available information alone that the market is over- or undervaluing that stock.9
Thus, after Fifth Third, plaintiffs were left with two options in ESOP breach of duty of care
claims: (1) allege a breach based on public information and be forced to plead a “special
circumstance” affecting market price reliability and/or (2) allege a breach based on nonpublic
information but (a) show an alternative action that could have been taken in compliance with
securities laws and (b) show that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have
viewed this action as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.10

5

Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d. 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995); In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation, 662 F.3d. 128,
136 (2d Cir. 2011); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995).
6
Moench, 62 F.3d at 566.
7
Cf In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation, 662 F.3d at 136 (applying the abuse of discretion standard instead
of a “stricter standard.”); Fifth Third Bancorp, 123 S. Ct at 2467 (“… because ESOP fiduciaries are
ERISA fiduciaries and because § 1104(a)(1)(B)'s duty of prudence applies to all ERISA fiduciaries,
ESOP fiduciaries are subject to the duty of prudence just as other ERISA fiduciaries are…”
8
In re UBS ERISA Litigation, No. 08-cv-6696, 2104 WL 4812387, *1,*9 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“It could
be argued that the Supreme Court's decision in [Fifth Third] has, if anything, raised the bar for plaintiffs
seeking to bring a claim based on a breach of the duty of prudence.”
9
Fifth Third Bancorp, 134 S. Ct at 2471.
10
Id. at 2472.
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II. An Application of Fifth Third Bancorp and the “prudent person standard”
The “prudent person” standard was applied to ESOP fiduciaries in In re Lehman Brothers
ERISA Litigation.11 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that under ERISA: (1) the Plan Committee
breached its fiduciary duty (a) by “failing to consider the prudence of continuing to invest in
Lehman” during the 2008 financial crisis (i.e. they knew or should have known that investment
in Lehman had become increasingly risky during the time) and, alternatively, (b) by “failing to
investigate nonpublic information regarding the risks facing Lehman;” and (2) there were special
circumstances affecting the reliability of the market price of Lehman stock as an unbiased
assessment of Lehman’s value.
Relying on Fifth Third Bancorp, the district court dismissed the first claims finding that
(1) there was not enough public information regarding Lehman during the 2008 financial crisis to
trigger ERISA’s prudence requirements, i.e. that a reasonably prudent fiduciary would not have
reconsidered continuing investment in Lehman at that time; and (2) creating a duty to investigate
nonpublic information would lead to a constant conflict between fiduciaries meeting that duty
and fiduciaries abiding by federal insider trading laws.12 Applying Fifth Third, the district court
stressed that a plaintiff must allege “an alternative action that the defendant could have taken that
would have been consistent with securities law” in support of a breach of fiduciary duty claim
that relies on nonpublic information.13 However, if a plaintiff does so he must also allege, the
district court stressed, that a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that taking such action
would do more harm than good.14

11

In re Lehman Brothers ERISA Litigation, 113 F. Supp.3d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding the 2008
investment in Lehman Brothers stock by an ESOP fiduciary was not a breach of fiduciary duty) aff’d,
Rinehart v. Lehman Bros. Holding Inc., No. 15-2229, 2016 WL 1077009 (2d Cir. 2016).
12
Id. at 755.
13
Id. at 748.
14
Id. at 756.
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The district court dismissed the second claim, holding that, absent “special
circumstances,” a company’s stock price is presumptively a valid assessment of its value in light
of public information.15 In other words, in the absence of "special circumstances," fiduciaries of
publicly traded companies cannot be liable for failing to act on publicly available information, as
that would require them to outsmart the market.16 Relying on this standard, the district court
dismissed the notion that a Securities and Exchange Commission order blocking short trades on
Lehman stock was a “special circumstance,” applying the general rule in the fiduciary’s favor.17
The “special circumstances” exemption to an ESOP fiduciary’s presumption of prudence
is crucial if the plaintiff alleges a breach based on public information.18 If plaintiffs can cite
publically available information indicating that a “special circumstance” affected the reliability
of a company’s market price, then their claim should survive a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b) motion for summary judgment and go to trial.19 However, if the plaintiff does not allege a
“special circumstance” affecting market price reliability, then this would be, in some courts, fatal
to any ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim based solely on public information.20
If a plaintiff alleges a breach based on nonpublic information, he must allege an alternate
action that could have been taken in compliance with securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary
in the same circumstances would not have viewed this action more likely to harm the fund than
to help it.
15

Id. at 754 (explaining that Dudenhoeffer bars claims on public information precisely because market is
competent to react to such information).
16
Guidelines for complying with prudent person rule for investments, 2 Emp. Coord. Benefits § 40:2
17
Id.
18
Smith v. Delta Air Lines Inc., Fed.Appx. 874, 876 (11th Cir. 2015) (dismissing an ERISA breach of
fiduciary claim because it did not allege a special circumstance [that rendered] reliance on the market
price imprudent).
19
See Id.
20
Coburn v. Evercore Trust Company, N.A., No. 15-49, 2016 WL 632180, *1, *5 (holding that the
plaintiffs decision not to plead special circumstances was fatal to her claim that the defendant should have
known solely from public information that continued investment in J.C. Penny stock was imprudent).
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III. Public and Nonpublic basis for breach
A. The “Special Circumstances” Exemption
In In re Lehman Brothers, the Southern District of New York held that a Securities and
Exchange Commission order blocking short trades on Lehman stock was not a “special
circumstance” under Fifth Third.21 The Supreme Court, however, in Fifth Third did not state
what constitutes “a special circumstance affecting the reliability of the market price.”22 Still,
some district courts and appellate briefs have discussed this issue since the Supreme Court’s
2014 Fifth Third decision.
Calling it a novel question, the district court in In re Lehman Brothers concluded that an
SEC order banning short trades of Lehman stock was not such a “special circumstance” because
the market would have processed that order like other publicly available information, leaving the
market price of Lehman undisturbed.23 The court also reasoned that even if the SEC order
indicated there was some distortion in Lehman’s market price, this distortion could have only
meant that Lehman’s stock price was depressed by short selling to an artificially low level. 24 This
would make Lehman’s stock less risky, according to the district court.25
The decision in In re Lehman Brothers was appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the plaintiffs in that case argued, in briefing, that the district
court conflated Fifth Third’s special circumstances exemption with a test that turns on whether
the market is able to process the publicly available information the plaintiff pleads as a special

21

Id.
Gedek v. Perez, 66 F.Supp.3d 368, 375 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
23
In re Lehman Brothers ERISA Litigation, 113 F. Supp.3d at 759-60, aff’d, Rinehart v. Lehman Bros.
Holding Inc., No. 15-2229, 2016 WL 1077009 (2d Cir. 2016).
22

24
25

Id.
Id.
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circumstance.26 Plaintiffs insisted that such a test does not answer the question of special
circumstance.27
The Southern District of New York rests Fifth Third’s “special circumstances” exception
on the ability of the market to process information. But, that begs the question, as plaintiffs point
out in the Lehman case’s appeal, do “special circumstances” only occur when the market is
unable to process certain publicly available information? In affirming the District Court’s
decision, the Second Circuit declined to wade into exactly what a “special circumstance” is,
citing Fifth Third.28 Instead, the Second Circuit narrowly held that an SEC order banning short
sales was not a “special circumstance” in that case.29
In Allen v. Greatbanc Trust Company, the Northern District of Illinois did not rest the
exemption on the market, calling it a “specific risk a fiduciary failed to properly assess
(emphasis added).30 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that Greatbanc Trust Company breached its
fiduciary duty when it (1) “paid too much for ... shares that it purchased because the price went
down after the transaction” and (2) it “borrowed money to fund this purchase at a rate higher
than the market.”31 However, the district court concluded that the plaintiff made no allegation of
special circumstances, holding that such an allegation was a requirement in ESOP breach of
fiduciary duty claims.

26

Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16.
Id.
28
Rinehart v. Lehman Bros. Holding Inc., No. 15-2229, 2016 WL 1077009, *1, *2 (“The Court [in Fifth
Third] specifically declined to consider ‘whether a plaintiff could nonetheless plausibly allege
imprudence on the basis of publicly available information by pointing to a special circumstance affecting
the reliability of the market price as ‘an unbiased assessment of the security's value in light of all public
information’ that would make reliance on the market's valuation imprudent.’(quoting Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,134 S.Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014))).
29
Rinehart v. Lehman Bros. Holding Inc., No. 15-2229, 2016 WL 1077009, *1, *5
30
Allen v. Greatbanc Trust Company, No. 15 C 3053, 2015 WL 5821772, *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
31
Id. at *2.
27
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In Fifth Third, the Supreme Court refers to a special circumstances affecting market
reliability. If the assumption, however, is that the market can process all publicly available
information then no circumstance would be special. Virtually all information, whether an SEC
order that blocks short trades on a stock or a government takeover of a company, would
presumptively be reflected in the market price.
B. An Alternate Action Consistent with Securities Law
In Murray v. Invacare Corp.32, the Northern District of Ohio concluded that the plaintiff
plausibly alleged (1) an alternative action that would be consistent with securities laws and that
(2) a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed this action more likely
to harm the fund than to help it.33 Plaintiffs, in that case, brought action against Invacare Corp.
for allegedly breaching their fiduciary duty of care “when they allowed [ESOP] … participants
to acquire more shares of Invacare stock at a time when defendants knew Invacare stock was an
imprudent investment.”34
Notably, plaintiffs relied on nonpublic information they alleged defendants had.35 Their
complaint asserted that defendants knew Invacare was not complying with Food and Drug
Administration safety and compliance standards relating to their “most important” products, that
Invacare was not addressing those deficiencies and that those deficiencies would lead to harsh
penalties that would depress the company’s stock price.36 Plaintiffs also asserted that armed with
this nonpublic information, the defendant knew or should have known to prevent Invacare ESOP

32

125 F.Supp.3d 660 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
Id. at 660.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
33
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participants from buying more of their companies stock.37 In other words, Invacare should have
known to “clos[e] the stock fund” before plaintiffs purchased more stock.38
Acknowledging that closing a stock fund is a “fairly extreme action with significant
consequence,” the district court held that such an action is not foreclosed as an “alternate action”
under Fifth Third. It explained that [a]n action [is not foreclosed as an alternate one] if the
complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary in defendant's position could have
concluded that such an action would not cause more harm than good.”39
It is clear, however, that pleading a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would
not have viewed closing a stock fund as more likely to harm the fund than to help it and
plausibly pleading such are two different things.40 In Amgen v. Harris, the Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, remanded a decision by the Ninth Circuit that held plaintiffs plausibly
alleged an “alternative action” (removing the Amgen Common Stock Fund from the list of
investment options) because plaintiffs plead no facts that plausibly indicate that action would not
harm the company more than hurt it. Amgen is the Courts first application of its Dudenhoeffer
standard and it makes it very clear how difficult the standard is to meet.
In a terse opinion, the Supreme Court, several times, quoted at length from its
Dudenhoeffer opinion. At one point it emphasized the plausibility of what is alleged:
“[L]ower courts faced with such claims should also consider whether the
complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant's
position could not have concluded that stopping purchases—which the market
might take as a sign that insider fiduciaries viewed the employer's stock as a bad
investment—or publicly disclosing negative information would do more harm

37

Id.
Id. at 669.
39
Allen v. Greatbanc Trust Company, No. 15 C 3053, 2015 WL 5821772, *1, *7 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
38

40

Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S.Ct 758 (2016).
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than good to the fund by causing a drop in the stock price and a concomitant drop
in the value of the stock already held by the fund.” (emphasis in original).41
In their amended complaint the plaintiffs in Amgen alleged a number of alternative actions
Invacare could have taken that were consistent with insider trading laws including:
“making appropriate disclosures as necessary; divesting the Plan of Company
Stock; precluding additional investment in Company Stock; consulting
independent fiduciaries regarding appropriate measures to take in order to
prudently and loyally serve the participants of the Plan; or resigning as fiduciaries
of the Plan to the extent that as a result of their employment by the Company they
could not loyally serve participants in the Plan in connection with the Plans'
acquisition and holding of Company Stock.”42
Plaintiffs, however, plead no facts that plausibly indicate taking any one of these actions would
not harm the fund more than help it.43
IV. Conclusion
According to the Supreme Court, Congress sought to encourage the creation of employee
stock option plans by passing ERISA.44 However, this purpose is in tension with the duty of care
standard applied to ESOP fiduciaries under 29 U.S.C. § 1104.45 If a true prudent person standard,
i.e., a stricter standard, was applied to ESOP fiduciaries then Congress’ purpose may be
hindered.46 Corporate fiduciaries would be dissuaded from taking the risk of ESOP creation. This
indicates that the standard, at least as the Supreme Court has held, is much harder to meet than a
true prudent person standard. This may be easier for plaintiffs to meet than an abuse of discretion
standard but there is no indication that is the case yet.

41

Id. at 759.
First Amended Class Action Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“erisa”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, No.CV 07-5442-PSG(PLA) 2010 WL11401029, ¶344
42

43

Id.
See Amgen, 136 S.Ct. at 759 (quoting Fifth Third, 134 S.Ct 2470).
45
Id.
46
See Id.
44
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What is clear, however, is that there are hurdles for plaintiffs to clear. If a breach on the
basis of public information is alleged, than they must plead a special circumstance that affects
the reliability of the market price. This test may rest on the ability of the market to process the
circumstance or whether a fiduciary properly assessed that circumstance. If they allege a breach
on the basis of nonpublic information then they must plausibly plead (1) an alternative action
consistent with securities laws and (2) that this action could not have harmed the plan more than
it helps it. Thus, the ESOP fiduciary duty of care standard is hard to meet and justifiably so. Any
other standard would go against this country’s long held policy of deferring to the business
judgment of corporate fiduciaries and Congress’ purpose of encouraging the creation of ESOPs.
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